SPAC Performance, Ownership and Corporate Governance
Authors:
- John S. HoweJHJohn S. Howe
- Scott W. O’brienSOScott W. O’brien
- 1 January 2012
- book chapter
- Published by Emerald Publishing
- p. 1-14
Abstract
Purpose – We examine how the ownership and corporate governance of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) influence their short- and long-run performance. Design/methodology/approach – By splitting our sample at the median value of different governance characteristics, we test for differences in short- and long-run performance between the low and high governance groups. Findings – We find weak evidence of a positive influence of board independence on performance, but no indication that either managerial or institutional ownership is associated with performance. Research limitations/implications – The study provides further evidence on the open question of how governance characteristics affect firm performance. Originality/value – We describe the unique conflicts that exist within a SPAC, and the recent evolution of their organizational structure in response to these conflicts.Keywords
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