How do different payment schemes to operators affect public transport concessions? A microeconomic model
Authors:
- Juan Pablo SepúlvedaJSJuan Pablo Sepúlveda
- Patricia GalileaPGPatricia Galilea
- 1 July 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Transport Policy
- Vol. 93, 27-35
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Centro de Desarrollo Urbano Sustentable (CONICYT/FONDAP/15110020)
- Volvo Research and Educational Foundations
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