Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) violations, especially among small and medium-sized suppliers, often persist even after disclosure and penalties. Two frictions are central: remediation is costly when firms lack the capability to correct violations, and market discipline is weak when stakeholders lack clear, actionable information linking violations to responsible parties. In response, leading NGOs have adopted an advocacy strategy that links a supplier’s violations to influential downstream buyers and discloses this connection to consumers, thereby increasing buyers’ market exposure and motivating them to support supplier remediation. We study when and how this strategy improves ESG outcomes along the supply chain. We develop a game-theoretic model of interactions among an NGO, a buyer, and a supplier and characterize the NGO’s optimal intervention. Our analysis identifies four regimes, determined by the relative remediation efficiencies of the buyer and the supplier, that guide NGO action: no intervention, transparency establishment that connects suppliers to key buyers, capability development that strengthens the NGO’s ability to make advocacy effective, and outreach that extends capability building to suppliers and consumers. ......