Moving beyond catch in allocation approaches for internationally shared fish stocks
Authors:
- Megan BaileyMBMegan Bailey
- Gakushi IshimuraGIGakushi Ishimura
- Richard PaisleyRPRichard Paisley
- U. Rashid SumailaUSU. Rashid Sumaila
- 1 July 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Marine Policy
- Vol. 40, 124-136
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
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