Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
Authors:
- Samson AlvaSASamson Alva
- Vikram ManjunathVMVikram Manjunath
- 1 May 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 181, 121-142
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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