Reading Downs: New Labour and An Economic Theory of Democracy
- 1 August 2005
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
- Vol. 7 (3) , 402-417
Abstract
In Downs' median voter theorem parties can only increase their vote by changing their policies and moving towards the electoral centre ground. This theorem has been used to sustain a particular and, I will argue, one-sided interpretation of New Labour's actions and political trajectory. There is more to An Economic Theory of Democracy than the median voter theorem. Downs argues that voters and parties operate in conditions of uncertainty and that this gives parties the opportunity to persuade voters to revise their beliefs. Parties can win elections not only by changing their policies but by changing voters' minds. Downs' arguments about persuasion can be used to generate an alternative and very different interpretation of New Labour.Keywords
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