Economics of Transboundary Aquifer Management
Authors:
- Janie M. ChermakJanie M. Chermak
- Robert H. PatrickRPRobert H. Patrick
- David S. BrookshireDBDavid S. Brookshire
- 5 August 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Groundwater
- Vol. 43 (5) , 731-736
Abstract
This paper presents a general model of optimal water management for a transboundary aquifer under three different management approaches: cooperative, noncooperative, and myopic. Comparing the results from the approaches, we find the cooperative solution, where a single management plan is executed for all parts of the aquifer, results in the highest level of net social welfare, followed by the noncooperative and then the myopic. The trade‐offs we find for the higher levels of welfare are lower use levels in the earlier periods. We present a short discussion of factors that can increase the inefficiencies of the models and suggest directions for future research.Keywords
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