Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises: The Role of Interest Rates
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- 1 November 2006
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 96 (5) , 1769-1787
Abstract
We develop a model of currency crises, in which traders are heterogeneously informed, and interest rates are endogenously determined in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium. In our model, multiple equilibria result from distinct roles an interest rate plays in determining domestic asset market allocations and the devaluation outcome. Except for special cases, this finding is not affected by the introduction of noisy private signals. We conclude that the global games results on equilibrium uniqueness do not apply to market-based models of currency crises.Keywords
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