Ethics, Personal Identity, and Ideals of the Person
Author:
- 1 June 1982
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 12 (2) , 229-246
Abstract
It is not uncommon for contemporary moral philosophers to appeal, in support or in criticism of one moral theory or another, to supposed features of or facts about persons. Rawls, for example, maintains that ‘utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons,’ and that since ‘the correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing,’ we should not expect utilitarianism to be the correct regulative scheme for human beings. Nozick, in a similar spirit, suggests that the deontological restrictions he calls ‘side constraints’ are desirable components of a moral conception because, without them, a moral scheme is unable to ‘sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that … [each individual] is a separate person,’ unable to take account of the fact that, with respect to each individual, ‘his is the only life he has.’ And Williams, to cite still another example, suggests that utilitarianism is a defective moral theory because ‘it cannot coherently describe the relations between a man's projects and his actions.'Keywords
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- Identities of Persons1976
- Moral Neutrality and Primary GoodsEthics, 1973
- Rawls' Theory of JusticeUniversity of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1973
- Rawls on JusticePhilosophical Review, 1973
- The Limits of IndividualismThe Journal of Philosophy, 1972
- Causal IrregularityPhilosophy of Science, 1972