The Myth and Reality of German Warfare

Authors:
  • GGGerhard P. Gross
    Gerhard P. Gross
  • DZDavid T. Zabecki
    David T. Zabecki
  • RCRobert M. Citino
    Robert M. Citino

Abstract
Landlocked in central Europe and surrounded by potential adversaries, nineteenth-century Prussia and twentieth-century Germany faced the prospect of multifront wars and wars of attrition. To counteract these threats, generations of German general staff officers were educated in operational thinking, the main factors of which—defining the center of gravity, risk assessment, speed, and maneuver—were extremely influential on military planning across the globe and were specifically adopted by American and Soviet armies. Based on such training, German staff officers and their adversaries directed m ... More Landlocked in central Europe and surrounded by potential adversaries, nineteenth-century Prussia and twentieth-century Germany faced the prospect of multifront wars and wars of attrition. To counteract these threats, generations of German general staff officers were educated in operational thinking, the main factors of which—defining the center of gravity, risk assessment, speed, and maneuver—were extremely influential on military planning across the globe and were specifically adopted by American and Soviet armies. Based on such training, German staff officers and their adversaries directed millions of soldiers to fight and die in the deserts of North Africa, at the gates of Paris, and on the vast Russian plains. During the twentieth century, Germany’s art of warfare dominated military theory and practice, creating a myth of German operational brilliance that lingers today, despite the nation’s crushing defeats in two world wars. In The Myth and Reality of German Warfare, Gerhard Gross provides a comprehensive examination of the development and failure of German operational thinking over a period of more than a century. He analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of five different German armies, from the mid-nineteenth century through the early days of NATO. Rather than arguing for an essential, time-transcendent German philosophy of war, he demonstrates that the German military tradition arose from a well-defined historical and geographical matrix and explores the interdependencies between armies and society as a whole. His innovative study reveals the political, social, strategic, and economic reasons for the eventual failure of Germany’s operational theories, as well as their human and personal consequences. He also offers fresh interpretations of several towering figures of Germany military history, including Moltke the Elder, Alfred von Schlieffen, and Erich Ludendorff. In this multiperspective examination of operational thought, Gross dismantles cherished myths and offers new insights on Germany’s failed attempts to become a global power through military means.