Legislating Organizational Probation: State Capacity, Business Power, and Corporate Crime Control
Author:
- William S. LofquistWLWilliam S. Lofquist
- 1 January 1993
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Law & Society Review
- Vol. 27 (4) , 741-783
Abstract
This study examines the development of organizational probation. That this sanction emerged from the long process of developing organizational sentencing guidelines as a clearly specified, widely available, and often binding sanction represents an unexpected statutory outcome: an interventionist, nonmarket sanction during a time of deregulatory free market policy and ideology. This outcome is explained through a multi-theoretical framework emphasizing the structural capacity of the primary lawmaking agency, the United States Sentencing Commission, the role of middle-level state workers, and the bounded rationality of strategic decisions made by business strategists and lobbyists.Keywords
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