Terrorism and signalling
Authors:
- Harvey E. LapanHLHarvey E. Lapan
- Todd SandlerTSTodd Sandler
- 1 August 1993
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 9 (3) , 383-397
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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- A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of PredationThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1986
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete InformationReview of Economic Studies, 1983
- A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational TerrorismAmerican Political Science Review, 1983
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium AnalysisEconometrica, 1982