Bank Regulation, Network Topology, and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the Great Depression
- 1 December 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 54 (5) , 1261-1312
Abstract
We study how bank regulation interacts with network topology to influence systemic stability. Employing unique hand‐collected data on the correspondent network for all U.S. banks prior to the Great Depression and a methodology that captures bank credit risk and network position, we demonstrate how the pyramid‐shaped network topology was inherently fragile and systemically risky. We measure its contribution to banking distress, and show that a bank's network position as well as its network neighbors' risk are strong predictors of bank survivorship. Institutional alternatives, such as branch banking, and alternative topologies deliver networks that are more stable than that of 1929.Keywords
This publication has 80 references indexed in Scilit:
- Econometric measures of connectedness and systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectorsJournal of Financial Economics, 2012
- Comparing Brain Networks of Different Size and Connectivity Density Using Graph TheoryPLOS ONE, 2010
- Identification of peer effects through social networksJournal of Econometrics, 2009
- A theory of power-law distributions in financial market fluctuationsNature, 2003
- Marginal Likelihood from the Gibbs OutputJournal of the American Statistical Association, 1995
- Markov Chains for Exploring Posterior DistributionsThe Annals of Statistics, 1994
- Pressure-group influence and institutional change: Branch-banking legislation during the Great DepressionPublic Choice, 1993
- Power and Centrality: A Family of MeasuresAmerican Journal of Sociology, 1987
- The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching CostsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1987
- A Reinterpretation of the Banking Crisis of 1930The Journal of Economic History, 1984