While Stability Lasts: A Stochastic Model of Non-Custodial Stablecoins
Preprint
Abstract
The `Black Thursday' crisis in cryptocurrency markets demonstrated deleveraging risks in over-collateralized non-custodial stablecoins. We develop a stochastic model that helps explain deleveraging crises in these over-collateralized systems. In our model, the stablecoin supply is decided by speculators who optimize the profitability of a leveraged position while incorporating the forward-looking cost of collateral liquidations, which involves the endogenous price of the stablecoin. We formally characterize regimes that are interpreted as stable and unstable for the stablecoin. We prove bounds on quadratic variation and the probability of large deviations in the stable domain and we demonstrate distinctly greater price variance in the unstable domain. We identify a deflationary deleveraging spiral by means of a submartingale. These deleveraging spirals, which resemble short squeezes, lead to faster collateral drawdown (and potential shortfalls) and are accompanied by higher price variance, as experienced on Black Thursday. We conclude by discussing non-custodial ways in which the issues raised in this paper can be mitigated.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- SoK: Decentralized Finance (DeFi)2022
- Competitive Equilibria Between Staking and On-chain Lending2020
- An Analysis of Uniswap markets2020
- The Blockchain Folk TheoremThe Review of Financial Studies, 2019
- Digital trade coin: towards a more stable digital currencyRoyal Society Open Science, 2018
- Fragility in money market funds: Sponsor support and regulationJournal of Financial Economics, 2016
- How Safe Are Money Market Funds?*The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2013
- Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacksJournal of Monetary Economics, 2007
- Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric InformationThe Review of Financial Studies, 1991
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and LiquidityJournal of Political Economy, 1983