Cooperative Conflicts and Gender Relations: Experimental Evidence from Southeast Uganda
- 6 September 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Feminist Economics
- Vol. 19 (4) , 25-47
Abstract
This study analyzes research results from experimental games played in the predominantly Bagisu area of Uganda in 2005. The games were designed to understand how husbands and wives manage household funds in relation to Amartya Sen's model of cooperative conflicts, which is widely used as a heuristic device for understanding intrahousehold bargaining. This study questions Sen's emphasis on the lower self-perceptions of personal welfare among women and on the role of cash contributions to the household as the basis of bargaining power, and it argues for a broader characterization of breakdown positions.Keywords
This publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
- Research with experimental gamesProgress in Development Studies, 2011
- Do Spouses Realise Cooperative Gains? Experimental Evidence from Rural UgandaWorld Development, 2011
- Researching the Researched: Gender, Reflexivity and Actor-Orientation in an Experimental GameThe European Journal of Development Research, 2009
- Resolving Risk? Marriage and Creative ConjugalityDevelopment and Change, 2007
- CREDIT AND WOMEN'S GROUP MEMBERSHIP IN SOUTH INDIA: TESTING MODELS OF INTRAHOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIVE BEHAVIORFeminist Economics, 2005
- Gender Analysis of Land: Beyond Land Rights for Women?Journal of Agrarian Change, 2003
- Men's work, masculinities and gender divisions of labourThe Journal of Development Studies, 1999
- ''Bargaining'' and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the HouseholdFeminist Economics, 1997
- Who Pays for the Kids?1994
- Outline of a Theory of Practice1977