Can Environmental Regulation Promote Green Innovation and Productivity? The Moderating Role of Government Interventions in Urban China

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Abstract
Can environmental regulation promote green innovation and the productivity of cities? The “Compliance Cost” (CC) perspective and the “Porter Hypothesis” (PH) offer contrasting views, whereas the existing empirical results are inconclusive. This paper aims to highlight the roles of multifaceted government interventions, including government-to-firm subsidies, tax levies on firms, and environmental infrastructure provisions, in moderating environmental regulation for realizing PH. Based on the fixed-effects models for Chinese prefecture cities from 2005–2013, we found that environmental regulation positively impacted green innovation but negatively affected productivity. The results of moderating effects suggest that environmental regulation can better promote green innovation if it is compounded with more government-to-firm subsidies, lower firm tax burdens, and increased environmental infrastructure provisions. We further decomposed the impacts of these interventions across seven fields of green innovation and found that subsidy and tax burden relief were especially effective in facilitating more GI in the sector of transportation and alternative energy production. This paper amplifies the theoretical framework of PH by accentuating the analytical lens of multifaceted government interventions but also provides insights into how local governments can effectively design “carrot-and-stick” policies to realize PH at the city level.
Funding Information
  • Zhejiang Office of Philosophy and Social Science (21YJRC05-2YB, 2020YFA0608601, LQ21G030012)
  • Key Research and Development Program of Ministry of Science and Technology of China (21YJRC05-2YB, 2020YFA0608601, LQ21G030012)
  • Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province (21YJRC05-2YB, 2020YFA0608601, LQ21G030012)

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