Independence of the central bank as a monetary policy authority
Authors:
- SESE “The Academy of Financial Management”SMSESE “The Academy of Financial Management”
- Oleksandr LyubichOLOleksandr Lyubich
- Gennadiy BortnikovGBGennadiy Bortnikov
- Natalia ShulgaNSNatalia Shulga
- Kiev National Trade and Economic UniversityKUKiev National Trade and Economic University
- 24 December 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by State Educational-Scientific Establishment The Academy of Financial Management in Fìnansi Ukraïni
- Vol. 2020 (11) , 35-55
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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