Efficient contracting and incentive agreements between regulators and bus operators: The influence of risk preferences of contracting agents on contract choice
Authors:
- David A. HensherDHDavid A. Hensher
- Chinh HoCHChinh Ho
- Louise KnowlesLKLouise Knowles
- 1 May 2016
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice
- Vol. 87, 22-40
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 54 references indexed in Scilit:
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