Are Foreign Donors Good Monitors?
Authors:
- 14 July 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in European Accounting Review
- Vol. 32 (1) , 29-54
Abstract
This paper examines whether and how foreign institutional donors play a monitoring role in the nonprofit sector. By analyzing 2567 Chinese nonprofit foundations from 2005 to 2014, we find that foundations with foreign institutional donors are associated with higher quality reporting. The effect is more pronounced for nonprofit foundations without established monitors in the form of large domestic donors, sophisticated donors, or national government oversight. These findings suggest that foreign institutional donors are indeed good monitors. Our results are robust to a myriad of alternative specifications and make important first steps in understanding the impact of foreign institutional donors in international giving, especially in developing countries.Keywords
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