Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
Authors:
Open Access
- 11 June 2018
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 539-556
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (FA9550-12-1-0423)
- National Science Foundation (CCF-1053605, IIS-1546108, CCF- 1161365)
This publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
- Characterizing conflicts in fair division of indivisible goods using a scale of criteriaAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2015
- Submodular secretary problem and extensionsACM Transactions on Algorithms, 2013
- An efficient polynomial time approximation scheme for load balancing on uniformly related machinesMathematical Programming, 2013
- The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal IncomesJournal of Political Economy, 2011
- Constrained Non-monotone Submodular Maximization: Offline and Secretary Algorithms2010
- On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are SubadditiveSIAM Journal on Computing, 2009
- Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model2008
- An approximation algorithm for max-min fair allocation of indivisible goods2007
- Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders2005
- Consistent Estimates Based on Partially Consistent ObservationsEconometrica, 1948