Abstract
The question of whether high-power groups would be more or less ethnocentric than low-power groups was examined in an intergroup conflict over valued resources. Sixty groups of Canadian female undergraduates participated in a simulation in which pairs of groups represented two parties in a dispute over five tracts of land. The pairs were given opposing matrices containing numbers that represented their client's differing preferences for 10 divisions of each tract. Subjects then had to negotiate a favorable settlement for their client through written messages. In the unequal-power conditions of the experiment, the high-power group could threaten to slow the negotiations repeatedly whereas the low-power group could do so only once. In the equal-power conditions, both groups could threaten each other twice. Halfway through the negotiations, progress toward settlement was or was not threatened, supposedly, by the other group. Consistent with Realistic Group Conflict theory (Campbell, 1965; Levine & Campbell, 1972) the results showed that threat increased ethnocentrism both in terms of increased dislike for the out-group and increased distancing along stereotype dimensions. However, this reaction was not moderated by power differences between the groups. These results are discussed in the context of past research, which suggests that high-power are more discriminatory than low-power groups.

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