Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction
Authors:
- Steffen HuckSHSteffen Huck
- Wieland MüllerWMWieland Müller
- 1 April 2005
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 51 (1) , 109-127
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 21 references indexed in Scilit:
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