Financial Policies and the Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Evidence from the Oil Industry
Author:
- John W. ByrdJBJohn W. Byrd
Preprint
- 1 January 2010
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Jensen (1986) posits that costly conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders are especially pronounced in companies with substantial amounts of freeKeywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the USJournal of Financial Economics, 2008
- Corporate Cash Reserves and AcquisitionsThe Journal of Finance, 1999
- Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers1996
- Deferred Taxes, Income and the 1986 Tax Reform ActCFA Magazine, 1987
- Valuation effects of corporate debt offeringsJournal of Financial Economics, 1986
- Convertible debt issuance, capital structure change and financing-related informationJournal of Financial Economics, 1984
- The Impact of Initiating Dividend Payments on Shareholders' WealthThe Journal of Business, 1983
- Common stock repurchasesJournal of Financial Economics, 1981