We examine consumer adaptation in payment use to a major currency reform, using India's 2016 demonetization as a natural experiment. Currency reforms that abruptly withdraw or redesign legal tender aim to curb unaccounted cash and promote digital payments, but they can also trigger hidden, illegal adaptation. India's reform, which invalidated 86% of circulating currency, created both a temporary shortage of legal tender and an urgent need for consumers to dispose of banned notes. Using detailed customer-level transaction data from a leading e-commerce platform and cross-regional variation in corruption, we apply a forensic economics approach to detect illicit use of demonetized cash in cash-on-delivery (COD) transactions, by colluding with corruptible delivery-agents. We do so by leveraging three sequential stages of customers' purchase journey: order placement, acceptance at delivery, and returns after acceptance. We find consistent evidence of illicit cash conversion, including an increase in the use of COD for high-price items, a higher acceptance rate of COD transactions in more corrupt regions, and a higher average return rate in COD transactions, during the 50-day conversion window. A latent-class analysis shows substantial heterogeneity: roughly half of customers adopted or increased digital payment use, while about a quarter circumvented the reform using illicit cash via COD. Thus, although the currency reform spurred digital adoption, its effectiveness in curbing unaccounted cash was weakened by illicit consumer adaptation.