The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems
Author:
- 1 January 1999
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 22 (1) , 1-24
Abstract
While the interventionist state was characterised by a high level of centralisation in administration and policy making, the regulatory state relies on extensive delegation of powers to independent institutions: regulatory agencies or commissions, but also the judiciary which is becoming an increasingly active player in the regulatory game. Delegation of important policy‐making powers to non‐majoritarian institutions raises novel problems of democratic legitimacy. This article argues that such problems should be tackled not by limiting the independence of the regulators, but rather by strengthening the accountability structure. Similar problems arise at the European level. Here, too, the correct solution is a better accountability structure rather than increased politicisation. The de‐politicisation of European policy making is a consequence of the fact that the large majority of Europe's voters support far‐reaching economic integration but oppose true political integration.Keywords
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