Corruption and the Distortion of Law Enforcement Effort
Authors:
- 4 January 2010
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in American Law and Economics Review
- Vol. 12 (1) , 162-180
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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