A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
Authors:
- H. P. YoungHYH. P. Young
- A. LevenglickALA. Levenglick
- 1 September 1978
- journal article
- Published by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM) in SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics
- Vol. 35 (2) , 285-300
Abstract
Condorcet’s principle of choosing the majority alternative whenever one exists is violated not only by Borda’s rule but by any scoring method; nevertheless the essential property of scoring functions—“consistency” of the outcome under aggregation of subgroups—is shown to be compatible with Condorcet’s principle. Moreover these two properties, suitably interpreted, together with neutrality, determine a unique rule known as Kemeny’s rule.Keywords
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