Control-flow restrictor
Authors:
Open Access
- 9 December 2013
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 309-318
Abstract
Runtime attacks that exploit software vulnerabilities are still an important concern nowadays. Even smartphone operating systems such as Apple's iOS are affected by such attacks since the system is implemented in Objective-C, a programming language that enables attacks such as buffer overflows. As a generic protection technique against a whole class of attacks, control-flow integrity (CFI) offers some interesting properties. Recent work demonstrated that CFI can be implemented on iOS by patching the binary during the loading process and adding an instrumentation layer that enforces CFI during runtime. However, this approach is of little practical value since it requires a jailbroken device, which hinders wide employment. Furthermore, binary patching has a certain performance impact. In this paper, we show how CFI can be implemented directly within a compiler, making the approach widely deployable on all kinds of iOS devices. We extend the LLVM compiler and add our CFI enforcement approach during the compilation phase of a given app. An empirical evaluation shows that the size and performance overhead is reasonable.Keywords
Funding Information
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
- Return-Oriented ProgrammingACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 2012
- Combining control-flow integrity and static analysis for efficient and validated data sandboxing2011
- Native Client: A Sandbox for Portable, Untrusted x86 Native Code2009
- Preventing Memory Error Exploits with WIT2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP 2008), 2008
- Lurking in the Shadows: Identifying Systemic Threats to Kernel Data2007
- Control-flow integrity2005
- Efficient Intrusion Detection using Automaton Inlining2005
- On the effectiveness of address-space randomization2004
- Beyond stack smashing: recent advances in exploiting buffer overrunsIEEE Security & Privacy, 2004
- Proof-carrying code1997