Does Public Ownership of Equity Improve Earnings Quality?
Authors:
- 1 January 2010
- journal article
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 85 (1) , 195-225
Abstract
We compare the quality of accounting numbers produced by two types of public firms—those with publicly traded equity and those with privately held equity that are nonetheless considered public by virtue of having publicly traded debt. We develop and test two hypotheses. The “demand” hypothesis holds that earnings of public equity firms are of higher quality than earnings of private equity firms due to stronger demand by shareholders and creditors for quality reporting. In contrast, the “opportunistic behavior” hypothesis posits that public equity firms, because their managers have a greater incentive to manage earnings, have lower earnings quality than their private equity peers. The results indicate that, consistent with the “opportunistic behavior” hypothesis, private equity firms have higher quality accruals and a lower propensity to manage income than public equity firms. We further find that public equity firms report more conservatively, in line with their greater litigation risk and agency costs.Keywords
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- IPO-mechanisms, monitoring and ownership structure11We would like to thank the referee, Larry Benveniste, and the editor, William Schwert, as well as Bruno Biais, Patrik Bolton, Susanne Espenlaub, Michael Fishman, Thierry Foucault, Gunther Franke, Julian Franks, Mark Grinblatt, Jean Jacque Laffont, Alexander Ljungqvist, Ernst Maug, Gerhard Orosel, Pegaret Pichler, Raguram Rajan, Jay Ritter, Ailsa Röell, Kristian Rydquist, Jean Tirole, Elu von Thadden, Ivo Welch, William Wilhelm, Joe Williams and Andrew Winton for helpful comments. This paper has been presented at the University of Alberta, Baruch College, the Free University of Brussels, the University of Gothenburg, HEC, the University of California, Irvine, the University of Lausanne, the London School of Economics, the University of Odense, Stockholm School of Economics, the University of British Columbia, UCLA, the University of Utah, the CEPR conferences in Tolouse and Gerzensee, the American Finance Association, the Western Finance Association and the European Finance Association. This paper was written while Stoughton visited the University of Vienna. He expresses his appreciation to the faculty and staff for an enjoyable stay.Journal of Financial Economics, 1998
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