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The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
Home
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The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
Author:
SB
Salvador Barbera
Salvador Barbera
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1 October 1977
journal article
Published by
JSTOR
in
Econometrica
Vol. 45
(7)
,
1573
DOI:
10.2307/1913950
Abstract
In this paper we study the possibility of constructing satisfactory social choice mechanisms whose outcomes are determined by a combination of voting and chance...
Keywords
CHANCE
LEAVE
MANIPULATION OF SOCIAL
SOCIAL CHOICE MECHANISMS
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Version 1, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)
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