Does Voluntary Adoption of a Clawback Provision Improve Financial Reporting Quality?
Authors:
- 16 September 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 30 (3) , 1027-1062
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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