Procedural and party effects in European Parliament roll-call votes
Author:
- 3 December 2010
- journal article
- other
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 11 (4) , 597-613
Abstract
I extend the standard spatial model of legislative voting to account for vote-specific party inducements and procedural differences. Focusing on voting in the 1999—2004 European Parliament, I find evidence of vote-specific party inducements in a large share of the roll call votes. Furthermore, MEPs position themselves differently across procedures. As most roll call votes are taken on non-legislative votes, these estimates may overemphasize voting pattern on these votes and downplay voting pattern on legislative votes. As such, these estimates may be a poorly suited for studying within party heterogeneity on legislative votes.Keywords
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