Two methods have been of dominant importance in post-war philosophizing. One involves turning away from the forms of common speech, while preserving much of the apparatus of the original programme of analysis. The other involves continued close attention to the forms of common speech, together with a vastly altered and extended conception of the nature and techniques of analysis. The first method is pursued mainly in America, and is associated especially with the names of Carnap and Quine. The second method is pursued mainly in England, and is associated especially with the names of Austin and Ryle. This chapter argues that the appearance of a deathly struggle between these two methods in contemporary philosophy is, in part at least, a misleading appearance, an illusion. For the two methods are not rival ways of attaining just the same end — ways of which one must be quite wrong if the other is quite right. They are, partly, complementary methods of achieving one end; and, partly, both of them, appropriate and closely related methods of achieving different, though closely related, ends.