After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies
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- 1 May 2004
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 94 (3) , 753-763
Abstract
In recent years economists have increasingly been concerned with understanding the creation of the "rules of the game"—in the broad sense of political economy—rather than merely the behaviors of agents within a set of rules already in place. The transition from plan to market of the countries in the former Soviet bloc entailed an experiment in creating new rules of the game. In going from a command economy, where almost all property is owned by the state, to a market economy, where individuals control their own property, an entirely new set of insti- tutions would need to be established in a short period. How could this be done?Keywords
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