Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful than its Remedies?
Authors:
- 1 May 2003
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 10 (3) , 259-280
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less HarmfulNational Tax Journal, 2001
- The Taxation of Interest in Europe: A Minimum Withholding Tax?2000
- Implementing tax coordinationJournal of Public Economics, 1999
- Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains From Nondiscrimination: the Case of Interest Taxation in EuropeThe Economic Journal, 1999
- Colluding on Relative PricesThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1997