Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality
Author:
- Andrés PereaAPAndrés Perea
- 1 January 2014
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 83, 231-254
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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