Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis
- 5 June 2009
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
- Vol. 6 (2) , 343-380
Abstract
Using a panel data set covering a range of developed and developing countries, we show that common‐law systems were more protective of shareholder interests than civil‐law ones in the period 1995–2005. However, civilian systems were catching up, suggesting that legal origin was not much of an obstacle to formal convergence in shareholder protection law. We find no evidence of a positive impact of these legal changes on stock market development. Possible explanations are that laws have been overly protective of shareholders and that transplanted laws have not worked well in contexts for which they were not suited.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 38 references indexed in Scilit:
- Assessing the long‐run economic impact of labour law systems: a theoretical reappraisal and analysis of new time series dataIndustrial Relations Journal, 2008
- Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Taking Armour & Skeel's Thesis to Continental EuropeSSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
- 'Law and Finance' RevisitedSSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
- The ‘Divorce’ of ownership from control from 1900 onwards: Re-calibrating imagined global trendsBusiness History, 2007
- Corporate Governance, Stock Market Development and Private Capital Accumulation: A Case Study of IndiaSSRN Electronic Journal, 2007
- Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development, and PoliticsJournal of the European Economic Association, 2006
- On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.'s 'Anti-Director Rights Index' under Consistent CodingSSRN Electronic Journal, 2006
- The Transplant EffectThe American Journal of Comparative Law, 2003
- The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and ControlThe Yale Law Journal, 2001
- The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be RightThe Journal of Legal Studies, 2001