Simulation trouble
- 17 July 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Neuroscience
- Vol. 2 (3-4) , 353-365
Abstract
I present arguments against both explicit and implicit versions of the simulation theory for intersubjective understanding. Logical, developmental, and phenomenological evidence counts against the concept of explicit simulation if this is to be understood as the pervasive or default way that we understand others. The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be the kind of simulation required by simulation theory, because it fails to explain how neuronal processes meet constraints that involve instrumentality and pretense. Implicit simulation theory also fails to explain how I can attribute a mental or emotion state that is different from my own to another person. I also provide a brief indication of an alternative interpretation of neural resonance systems.Keywords
This publication has 31 references indexed in Scilit:
- Does Simulation Theory Really Involve Simulation?∗Philosophical Psychology, 2006
- Understanding Interpersonal Problems in Autism: Interaction Theory as An Alternative to Theory of MindPhilosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 2004
- The co-consciousness hypothesisPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2004
- Self-awareness and actionCurrent Opinion in Neurobiology, 2003
- The neural correlates of action understanding in non-human primates2002
- 2. From simulation to theory2002
- Introduction2002
- Discerning intentions in dynamic human actionTrends in Cognitive Sciences, 2001
- Motor facilitation during action observation: a magnetic stimulation studyJournal of Neurophysiology, 1995
- Actual Minds, Possible Worlds1986