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Home
Publications
Joint Projects without Commitment
Home
Publications
Joint Projects without Commitment
Joint Projects without Commitment
Authors:
AA
Anat R. Admati
Anat R. Admati
MP
Motty Perry
Motty Perry
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1 April 1991
journal article
Published by
Oxford University Press (OUP)
in
Review of Economic Studies
Vol. 58
(2)
,
259-276
DOI:
10.2307/2297967
Abstract
This paper concerns the pattern of contributions to a joint project when commitments and enforceable contracts are not available. We analyse a game i
Keywords
JOINT
INEFFICIENT
PERFECT
PATH
SUBSCRIPTION
MADE
CONTRACTS
SUNK
SUBGAME
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