On the Shapley value of liability games
Authors:
- Péter CsókaPCPéter Csóka
- Ferenc IllésFIFerenc Illés
- Tamás SolymosiTSTamás Solymosi
Open Access
- 1 July 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 300 (1) , 378-386
Abstract
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Funding Information
- Magyar Tudományos Akadémia (KEP-6/2017)
- National Research Development and Innovation Office
- National Research, Development and Innovation Office (K-120035)
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