Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction

Authors:
  • DLDavid Levine
    David Levine
  • EDEddie Dekel
    Eddie Dekel
  • DFDrew Fudenberg
    Drew Fudenberg

  • 1 January 2002
Abstract
In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses “trembles†to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory 89, 165–185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended.