An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks
Authors:
Open Access
- 28 October 2007
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 286-296
Abstract
We present a model of adaptive side-channel attacks which we combine with information-theoretic metrics to quantify the information revealed to an attacker. This allows us to express an attacker's remaining uncertainty about a secret as a function of the number of side-channel measurements made. We present algorithms and approximation techniques for computing this measure. We also give examples of how they can be used to analyze the resistance of hardware implementations of cryptographic functions to both timing and power attacks.Keywords
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