Linear carrot-and-stick: Compensation design with ordering delegation and demand updating
- 21 January 2026
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
- Vol. 208
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71921001)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (72091210/72091215)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (72001199)
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