Middlemen in Limit-Order Markets
Preprint
- 1 January 2011
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
A limit order market enables an early seller to trade with a late buyer by leaving a price quote. Information arrival in the interim period creates adverse selection risk for the seller and therefore hampers trade. Entry of high-frequency traders (HFTs) might restore trade as their machines can refresh quotes quickly on (hard) information. Empirically, HFT entry reduced adverse selection by 23% and increased trade by 17%. Model calibration shows that one percentage point more of the gains from trade were realized. Finally, we show that a well-designed double auction raises this to ten percentage points.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- High frequency trading and the new market makersJournal of Financial Markets, 2013
- Trading Fees and Efficiency in Limit Order MarketsThe Review of Financial Studies, 2012
- Informed traders and limit order marketsJournal of Financial Economics, 2009
- Information Percolation With Equilibrium Search DynamicsEconometrica, 2009
- MIDDLEMEN IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*International Economic Review, 2007
- Estimating the Gains from Trade in Limit‐Order MarketsThe Journal of Finance, 2006
- MiddlemenThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987
- Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed tradersJournal of Financial Economics, 1985