Learning to accept in ultimatum games: Evidence from an experimental design that generates low offers
Authors:
- 1 June 2000
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 3 (1) , 11-29
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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