Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation
- 10 February 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Managerial Science
- Vol. 12 (3) , 711-736
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Deutscher Verein für Versicherungswissenschaft (n.a.)
- Volkswagen Foundation (85487)
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