Choosing Bargaining Partners—An Experimental Study on the Impact of Information About Income, Status and Gender
- 1 September 2005
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 8 (3) , 183-216
Abstract
Ultimatum proposals and dictator donations are studied when proposers can choose the income and sex of the responder. Responder attributes generated strong effects in the selection decisions; subjects preferred to send proposals to low-income responders and female responders were much more popular than males. Hence, signals of income and sex appear to be important in deciding with whom to bargain. We also report from an experiment where both responders and proposers could select co-player based on socioeconomic status and gender. Both female responders and proposers were strongly preferred. A weaker tendency was that high status subjects were favored.Keywords
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