Infinite utility: counterparts and ultimate locations
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Abstract
The locations problem in infinite ethics concerns the relative moral status of different categories of potential bearers of value, the primary examples of which are people and points in time. The challenge is to determine which category of value bearers are of ultimate moral significance: the ultimate locations, for short. This paper defends the view that the ultimate locations are 'people at times'. A person at a time is not a specific person, but the person born at a specific point in time (de dicto). The main conclusion of the paper is that the unsettling implications of the time- and person-centered approaches to infinite ethics can be avoided. Most notably, a broad class of worlds that person-centered views deem incomparable can be strictly ranked.Keywords
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