Abstract
We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earning outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoids an equal and Pareto efficient outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.
Funding Information
  • Economic and Social Research Council (ES/K0022/01/1)
  • British Academy
  • Labex (ANR-11-LABX-0042)
  • Université de Lyon (ANR-11-IDEX-007)
  • French National Research Agency

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