Efficiency Versus Equality in Bargaining
Open Access
- 31 August 2018
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 17 (6) , 1941-1970
Abstract
We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earning outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoids an equal and Pareto efficient outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.Keywords
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Funding Information
- Economic and Social Research Council (ES/K0022/01/1)
- British Academy
- Labex (ANR-11-LABX-0042)
- Université de Lyon (ANR-11-IDEX-007)
- French National Research Agency
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