A Test of Conspicuous Consumption: Visibility and Income Elasticities
Author:
Top Cited Papers
- 1 November 2011
- journal article
- Published by MIT Press in Review of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 93 (4) , 1101-1117
Abstract
This paper shows that, consistent with a signaling-by-consuming model à la Veblen, income elasticities can be predicted from the visibility of consumer expenditures. We outline a stylized conspicuous consumption model where income elasticity is endogenously predicted to be higher if a good is visible and lower if it is not. We then develop a survey-based measure of expenditure visibility, ranking different expenditures by how noticeable they are to others. Finally, we show that our visibility measure predicts up to one-third of the observed variation in elasticities across consumption categories in U.S. data. © 2011 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.Keywords
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- Conspicuous Consumption and Race*The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009
- Empirical tests of status consumption: Evidence from women's cosmeticsJournal of Economic Psychology, 1998
- Kernel Regression in Empirical MicroeconomicsThe Journal of Human Resources, 1998
- On limiting the market for status signalsJournal of Public Economics, 1994
- Design-adaptive Nonparametric RegressionJournal of the American Statistical Association, 1992
- A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational CascadesJournal of Political Economy, 1992
- A Simple Model of Herd BehaviorThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992
- Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status gamesJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1989
- Job Market SignalingThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973
- A theory of human motivation.Psychological Review, 1943